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Adolescent Misconduct and the Juvenile 
Justice System 
Rosemary C. San-i 
University of Michigan 
Societal response to non-criminal behavior of adolescent youth 
has been an area of great concern for more than a century. 
However, despite considerable legislative and judicial action at 
state and federal levels, the problem has not abated, and, in 
fact, it may be more serious today than it has been in the past. 
For nearly two decades, this society has sought to constrain 
and limit the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over misconduct 
that was once a primary concern of that institution, namely 
that behavior which is illegal only for juveniles. Ever since the 
President’s Commission on Criminal Justice convened in 1967, 
a national effort has been underway to limit the court’s juris- 
diction. That effort culminated in the passage of the Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974. In that legis- 
lation the Congress stated that it would provide grants to 
states which modified their handling of juvenile status of- 
fenders. Since then, substantial progress has occurred in the 
majority of states, but the problem continues and is far from 
solution. This is not a new problem, and perhaps that is why 
alternative policies and programs are so difficult to imple- 
ment. Ever since Colonial times, the state has authorized the 
court to intervene to support the authority of parents and the 
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integrity of the family as an economic unit. Despite the tre- 
mendous changes that have occurred in this society, the court 
jurisdiction over non-criminal misconduct continues wide- 
spread and is operative in all but a small minority of states. 
The juvenile court is also utilized to regulate parent-child rela- 
tionships in significant ways, as has been noted by Mahoney 
(19’74), Teitelbaum and Gough (1978), and others. 
On the basis of the concept parens patriae, the juvenile 
court has been authorized to intervene wherever a juvenile’s 
behavior is deemed problematic for the family, society, or 
even for the youth. Thus, behavior such as truancy, curfew 
violation, unruliness, incorrigibility, or even “idling one’s time 
away” has been as sufficient a basis for the juvenile court to 
adjudicate a youth, as is the commission of a felony or mis- 
demeanor. For more than 75 years, the court has processed 
juveniles with high proportions of status offenders in some 
courts and few, or none, in others. Only since 1977, with the 
more stringent amendments to P.L. 93-415, have states modi- 
fied their behavior and, even now, only a small minority of 
states have amended their statutes to remove status offenses 
from the jurisdiction of the court. 
Who Are the Status Offenders? 
A status offender is commonly defined as a minor who 
engages in conduct that would not result in a criminal charge 
if committed by an adult. Typical examples are “truancy,” 
“curfew violations,” “promiscuity,” “running away,” “growing 
up in idleness,” and “incorrigibility.” Thus, status offenses re- 
fer both to specific behaviors and to general personality char- 
acteristics. They are “catchails” for a youth’s alleged pattern of 
stubbornness or rebelliousness. Although status offenders pre- 
sent no imminent threat to society, their conduct impairs their 
development, it is said; therefore, the state should intervene to 
constrain negative development. Few recognize that parental 
defiance and other forms of non-criminal misbehavior repre- 
sent a youthful push for independence that is typical, but 
transitory. 
Although empirical evidence is lacking, substantial infor- 
mation suggests that the proportion of status offenders pro- 
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cessed and adjudicated as such by the juvenile court has risen 
substantially in the past decade (Lerman, 1970; Sarri & 
Vinter, 1974; Spergel, Lynch, Korbelik, & Reamer, 1979). 
There is reason to believe that youths in the United States are 
being subjected to increasing societal control (Gordon, 1978; 
Spergel et al., 1979). 
Adolescence is well-recognized as a time for experimenta- 
tion with life-styles, philosophies, modes of behavior, and chal- 
lenges to the status quo by testing the agents of authority- 
schools, police, and parents (Constanzo & Shaw, 1966; Erik- 
son, 1967; Ken&ton, 1976). Today, instead of encouraging 
and tolerating experimentation that may produce more pro- 
ductive and capable adults, youth are subjected to more rigid 
authority in many community settings. Furthermore, in 
crowded urban communities high levels of conformity to adult 
behavior are required. Thus, an almost perfect setting for 
frustration and hostility is created.’ 
Although some have suggested that contemporary life- 
styles of youth differ too radically from those of adults, stu- 
dents of history can point to numerous instances in the past 
where similar differences in perspectives prevailed. Perhaps of 
significance today is the observation that youthful expression 
is less tolerated because youth are not the economic resource 
for the society that they once were. As a result, they are ex- 
pected to be docile and conforming to adult requirements. 
Donzelot’s (1979) recent historical study of the relationship 
between industrialization and family structure is particularly 
provocative in this regard. He points out that the juvenile 
court has come to control both the family and youth for gen- 
eral social control goals, and that it really provides little assis- 
tance to parents who need support in child-rearing, except 
psychological counseling to further control. 
‘In an address to a convention of secondary school principals in Washington 
D.C. in February, 1976, President Gerald Ford admonished the educarors to 
change their way of teaching so as to educate children to admire the nation’s 
strengths, to correct its faults, “and to participate effectively as citizens . . . 
Young people in particular appear cynical and alienated from our govern- 
ment and legal system , . Too many Americans see the law as a threat 
rather than a protection.” The operation of the juvenile justice system today 
does little to modify the juvenile’s alienation or views of that system as a 
serious threat to their well-being. 
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Contemporary society provides few legitimate opportu- 
nities for adolescents and young adults; the highest rates of 
unemployment are to be found in this age group (Westcott, 
1979). It is not surprising that youth respond to this situation 
with great hostility and alienation. In turn, the adult society 
responds with even greater control-a self-defeating strategy. 
Not long ago, Keniston (1976) and Heyns (1976) argued that 
a new conceptualization of adolescence is urgently needed in 
the United States. Lay, as well as professional, observers now 
would concur that there has been little serious consideration 
of fundamental new approaches toward adolescent and young 
adulthood. Substantial proportions of adolescent youth can 
be expected to experience problems in growing up in a com- 
plex, unstable, and highly mobile society. where social sup- 
ports for parents, as well as youth, are inadequate and in- 
equitably available. 
The majority of services available to youth and their par- 
ents today are directed toward intervention after problematic 
behavior has surfaced. Youth, then, are said to require “treat- 
ment” under the auspices of health, criminal justice, and other 
agencies. If society, instead, assumed that adolescent youth 
were a ~pulation at risk in specific sectors because of charac- 
teristics of the society, as well as particular attributes of the 
individuals, quite different policies and programs would be 
developed. For example, in the case of the health of the popu- 
lation, we no longer wait until a disease epidemic has emerged 
(e.g., measles, polio, cholera. etc.). Instead, we have, through 
public health programs, developed vaccines, sanitary water 
supplies, and so forth to prevent and control these diseases. A 
similar approach could be applied with respect to the expected 
socio-emotional health of adolescent youth. 
Statutory and Case Law re Status Offenders 
Any conceptualization of status offenders must inevitably 
consider the legal definitions outlined in the juvenile codes 
and the provisions which are established in both statute and 
case law to govern juvenile court behavior vis-a-vis these 
phenomena. 
Statutory differences among the states are startling with 
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respect to jurisdiction of the juvenile court with regard to:( 1) 
age, (2) scope and nature of delinquent and status offense 
definitions, (3) offense limitations on the court’s powers, (4) 
jurisdictional conflicts, and (5) permissible interaction with the 
adult system (Levin & Sarri, 1974). As of 1977 all 50 states and 
the District of Columbia retained status offenders within the 
purview of the juvenile court, but the passage of the federal 
JJDP act stimulated many code revisions. In a number of 
states juveniles with selected characteristics are being removed 
from various areas of court control. Our earlier analysis as of 
1972 revealed that 24 states and the District of Columbia had 
already developed separate categories for classifying status of- 
fenders (PINS, GINS, MINS, etc.), with eight other states hav- 
ing mixed categories (Levin & Sarri, 1974). Since that time, 
many states have effected changes in their juvenile codes 
(Pennsylvania, 1977). Several have promulgated stringent 
limitations on the definition and processing of status offenses 
(e.g., Washington, Wisconsin, California, Pennsylvania, etc.). 
The majority of states have fairly stringent prohibitions 
against placement of status offenders with other delinquents 
in correctional facilities. Often, however, status offenders may 
violate probation requirements or will be classified as not 
amenable to rehabilitation. In such cases, youth often are de- 
clared delinquent and in no way differentiated from other 
delinquents. Thus, statutory provisions do not protect against 
negative labeling and stigmatizing processes. 
One illustration of these processes is provided by recent 
Florida legislation (Florida S.B. 165) which was initially her- 
alded as a major reform. There, the new juvenile code essen- 
tially removed the status offender category known as GINS. 
Certain categories of status offenders (i.e., runaway, truancy, 
and ungovernability) were placed in a dependent child cate- 
gory. Services to them were to be provided by the public child 
welfare agencies on a voluntary basis. However, a major loop- 
hole was permitted in that the law states: 
The first time a child is adjudicated as ungovernable, he may be 
treated as a dependent child and provisions relating to dependency 
shall be applicable. For the second and subsequent adjudication for 
ungovernability, the child may be treated and defined as delinquent. 
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He or she thereby becomes subject to the full panopoly of 
juvenile correctional action, including institutionalization. 
Due to the potentially damaging effects of labeling 
(Gough, 1978; Lemert, 1969; Mahoney, 1974; Piliavin & 
Briar, 1964; Sheridan, 1967), explicit reference to juveniles 
along with delinquents may well start the process of overcrimi- 
nalization by failure to distinguish properly between catego- 
ries of juvenile deviant behavior. As we will note subsequently, 
empirical evidence substantiates the claim that juveniles who 
are processed as status offenders differ in their deviant behav- 
ior patterns from those who are charged with more serious 
law violations (Carter, 1979; Isenstadt, Selo & Barton, 1976; 
Spergel, et al., 1979). It is still possible, however, that an un- 
ruly child could be placed under supervision at age 12 and 
remain in that status until he or she reached the upper age 
limit of court jurisdiction, which in some states is as high as 21 
years. Often such youths when placed under court jurisdiction 
react by “acting out” in ways which provoke subsequent court 
action; thus, the vicious cycle of “action-reaction” is underway. 
It seems quite clear that parsimony with respect to court inter- 
vention has substantially more empirical support than do lib- 
eral, early intervention policies, if the long-run goal is more 
effective socialization. As Rosenheim (1960) notes, neither so- 
ciety, nor the youth involved, benefit from the processing of 
these nuisances. 
Statutory review indicates that status offenders are still 
largely viewed as misbehaving youth who require court inter- 
vention. The impact of the Juvenile Delinquency and Preven- 
tion Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-415), and amended in 1977, ad- 
dresses the problem directly, but few resources are provided 
for handling these youth wholly outside the court. Statutes 
continue to predispose the judicial system to focus on referred 
youth rather than on the situations and conditions that pre- 
cipitated the referral. 
Litigation 
Challenges to status offenses have arisen most frequently 
for the following reasons: (1) vagueness; (2) punishment of a 
condition; and (3) overbreadth. 
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Void for Vagueness. The Supreme Court struck down stat- 
utes which “either forbid or require the doing of an act in 
terms too vague that men of common intelligence must neces- 
sarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application” 
[Conn&y v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 39 (1926)]. 
More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court, in vacating a 
California Federal District Court decision, held that the Cali- 
fornia juvenile statute was void because it granted juvenile 
court jurisdiction over children who were “in danger of lead- 
ing an idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral life.” Such a statute 
was void, the court said, because it failed to give warning of 
proscribed conduct or information to the fact-finder to enable 
him to accurately recognize such conduct [Gonzalez v. Maillard, 
No. 50424 (N.D. Calif. Feb. 9, 1971), vacated 416 U.S. 918 
(1974)]. 
Punishment of a Condition. In 1962, the United States Su- 
preme Court, in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), 
reversed a conviction for violation of a California penal code, 
making it a criminal offense to “be addicted to the use of 
narcotics.” The Court held that Robinson manifest.ed a condi- 
tion-“ addiction”- which he was not able to control; thus, the 
defendant maintained a particular “status.” Mr. Justice Doug- 
las, in his concurring opinion stated: 
We would forget the teachings of the Eighth Amendment, if we 
allowed sickness to be made a crime and permitted sick people to be 
punished for being sick. This age of enlightenment cannot tolerate 
such barbarous action (370 U.S. 678). 
The effect of Robinson v. California was to support the 
argument that a status must be differentiated from a criminal 
act and that punishment for a status offense is in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment. This argument has continued to sur- 
face in cases involving convictions of chronic alcoholics for 
public intoxication [Easter v. D.C., 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 
1966), Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966), and the 
ultimate Supreme Court decision which upheld the constitu- 
tionality of convictions of chronic alcoholics for public intoxi- 
cation, Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 5 14 (1968)]. 
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The previous constitutional arguments attacked adult sys- 
tem practices, punishing status rather than behavior. In the 
past decade, there have been similar attempts to confront stat- 
utes applicable to juveniles. In Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 
371 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), the Wayward Minor Statute of New York 
was declared unconstitutional. The act granted adult criminal 
jurisdiction over youth 16 through 21 who were punished for 
being “morally depraved” and “in danger of becoming mor- 
ally depraved.” The court stated that Wayward Minor Statute 
permitted “the unconstitutional punishment of a minor’s con- 
dition rather than of any specific action.” 
On the other hand, decisions have supported statutes 
permitting intervention. In Blundheim v. State of Washington, 
529 P.2d 1096 (1975), the Washington Supreme Court upheld 
the constitutionality of that state’s incorrigibility statute and 
ruled that punishment for this offense was not cruel and un- 
usual. (In this particular case a 17-year-old female had run 
away from home and various placements eight times in three 
months.) The statute read: 
An incorrigible child is one less than 18 who is beyond control of his 
parents, guardian, or custodian by reason of the conduct or nature 
of said child. 
The girl contended that the statute punished the “status” of 
being incorrigible in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The 
court, although not denying that incorrigibility is a condition 
or state of being, justified the statute’s legitimacy by stating 
that one acquires such a status only by reason of one’s conduct 
or a pattern of behavior proscribed by the statute. Engaging in 
conduct that placed her beyond the lawfully exercised control 
of her mother was felt to be sufficient basis for support of an 
adjudication of incorrigibility. The court, however, did not 
show awareness of parental involvement, nor did it ac- 
knowledge that the parents also could have been charged. 
In 1977, the Supreme Court of Appeals in West Virginia 
utilized constitutional standards rather than a statutory inter- 
pretation, as in the In re Ellery C. Case. In State ex r-d Hami v. 
Calendine, 223 S.E.Pd 318, the Court ruled that incarceration 
of status offense youth in institutions with delinquents violated 
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guarantees of equal protection, due process, and protection 
against cruel and unusual punishment. These holdings were 
subsequently enacted into statutes in West Virginia. 
~~e~~~e~~~~. This may be another basis for an attack on 
status offense statutes. In the case of Slate v. ~u~~ieZ~o, 4 Conn. 
Civ. 55, 225 A.2d 507 (App. Div. 1969), the court upheld a 
conviction of a female juvenile for violation of the Connecticut 
statute, “forbidding walking with a lascivious carriage.” The 
Appellate Division upheld the statute as valid under the con- 
cept of parens @&iue, that the preceding was civil rather than 
criminal, and that its end was not to punish, but to rehabilitate 
the child through guardianship and protection. 
Another form of overbreadth has existed in the institu- 
tionalization of status offenders with delinquent youth. In In 
re EZZery C., 32 N.Y.Pd 588 (1973), the New York Supreme 
Court concluded that confmement at a public training school 
was not appropriate supervision or treatment. It further 
ordered the Department of Youth Services to provide ade- 
quate treatment, but it did not specify how PINS should be 
supervised. Therefore, the findings of the Institute of Judicial 
Administration (1975) were not surprising. They observed 
that the separation requirements failed to make any subse- 
quent improvement in the care of troubled children. 
In a subsequent case, In re Lovette h/l., 35 N.Y.Sd 136, 359 
N.Y.S.Sd 41 (I974), the Court of Appeals refused to hold that 
placement of a PINS in a training school was unlawful per se, 
stating that: 
It is confinement of PINS children in a prison atmosphere along 
with juveniles convicted of criminal acts that is proscribed and not 
the fact of placement in a training school. (p. 141) 
Similar cases in other states demonstrate that legislative 
restriction does not prevent the use of private institutions or 
community-based residential facilities by the court: In Gary u’. 
v. Stewart, No. 74-2412 (E.D. La., filed December 30, 1974), 
the transfer of 400 youth to private institutions in Texas was 
challenged. Obviously, barring commitment of status of- 
fenders to public institutions is only a partial solution, since 
248 SZUri 
private facilities-even so-called community-based programs- 
may infringe as much on individual liberty as the public insti- 
tution or public detention facility. 
The Contemporary Scene 
Numbers of Youth. Status offenders presently are pro- 
cessed as juvenile delinquents in the majority of states, but 
because adequate information procedures are lacking at locai, 
state, and national levels, it is not possible to report accurately 
even the total number of juveniles who are processed through 
the justice system each year. In 1977, 1,355,490 delinquency 
cases were processed by the nation’s juvenile courts, based on 
voluntary reports to the National Center for Juvenile Justice 
(NCJJ, 1980). If we add to that some estimate of the numbers 
in non-reporting counties plus those held in jails, institutions, 
and detention facilities, one can easily produce an estimate in 
excess of two million cases. There is no way to determine the 
extent of overlap-and, therefore, no reliable means of esti- 
mating the unduplicated count of individuals. However, given 
the estimated child population of 29.5 million between the 
ages of 10 and 18 in 1972 in the United States, the overall rate 
of processing is 45.9 cases per 1,000 potentially processed as 
delinquent each year (NCJJ, 1980). Moreover, if we were to 
concentrate on the more vulnerable years of 12 to 18, the 
proportions would exceed one in 15. Data from NAJC survey 
of 400 juvenile courts corroborate this estimate of the level of 
intervention (Sarri & Hasenfeld, 1976). Three-fourths of the 
cases processed are males, producing a rate of 69 per thou- 
sand for them versus 21.8 for females. 
Contemporary Court Processing and Disposition 
What proportion of the cases are status offenders? Again, 
that proportion can only be crudely estimated because of the 
lack of adequate information systems. But, from the national 
study of juvenile courts and correction facilities conducted by 
the National Assessment of Juvenile Courts, we can conserva- 
tively estimate the proportion at 30%. Thus, approximately 
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TABLE 1 
Juvenile Referrals by Offense and Detention Rate, Hennepin 
County, Minnesota, 1974 
Charge Number Referred 
Number Detained 
% 
Incorrigibility 472 82.8 
Truancy 16 75.0 
Absenting (runaway) 1790 72.8 
Robbery 162 77.2 
Assault 172 59.9 
Burglary 531 50.8 
Source of Data: Community Welfare Council, Hennepin County, Minnesota: Hcntw- 
pin County’s Status Offenders: A Preliminq Report. January 9, 1976. 
600,000 status offense cases can be expected to be processed 
and/or served through the juvenile courts and correctional 
programs of the United States each year.2 
Variations among counties within a state are large, with 
some having fewer than 10% of their caseload in status of- 
fenses and others having as high as 60%. Thus, one cannot 
expect to find a similar pattern within or between states. 
Studies by Lerman (1970) and Sax-xi and Hasenfeld (1976) and 
Sarri and Vinter (1974) document the disproportional repre- 
sentation of status offenders in detention, as does a Hennepin 
County, Minnesota report of court referrals and detention 
(Community Welfare Council, 1976). Minnesota is one of the 
states in which no distinction is drawn between status of- 
fenders and youth charged with felonies and misdemeanors. 
In 1974, 45.6% of all referrals to the court were status of- 
fenders, but they constituted 55.8% of all who were admitted 
to detention. The data in Table 1 illustrate the strict control of 
status offenders in this metropolitan county. 
These findings are particularly disturbing because they 
show a very high rate of detention for all juvenile cases, but 
‘The National Advisorv Commission on Correctional Standards and Goals 
(1973) estimated that 4b% of the dispositions of the juvenile court involved 
status offenders. More than twenty years ago William Sheridan (1965) 
surveyed a sample of correctional institutions and found that 30% of the 
youth were committed for conduct which would not have been criminal had 
they been adults. NCJJ (1980) report a total of 37% of all cases in status and 
other categories. 
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especially for those who present no threat to the community. 
This is in sharp contrast to the case of adult jailing, where it IS 
commonly accepted that persons are to be held only if the 
public will be endangered by their release, or if there is rea- 
sonable evidence to believe the person will abscond.:’ 
These data also illustrate the impact of variable organiza- 
tional strategies, for only 16 youth were referred for truancy 
in Hennepin County. Given the numbers of youth in school in 
the county, this number is far below that which would typically 
be expected. Thus, it is probable that schools in Minneapolis 
and other communities in the county have utilized alternative 
strategies for dealing with school truants.“.’ 
It was possible to estimate that 33-35% of the committed 
youth in correctional facilities, as of 1974, were status offenders 
(Grichting, 1975; US. NCJ ISS, 1978)” The data in Table 2 is 
from a nationally representative sample of correctional pro- 
grams studied by the National Assessment of Juvenile Correc- 
tions, which enabled us to determine whether status offenders 
and juvenile delinquents were separated during disposition. 
The sample consists of 20 public and 22 private facilities for 
adjudicated youth. Thirty-seven of the 42 facilities were located 
in states which in 1972 required, by statute, the separation of 
these youth during disposition. Only two out of 
sThese findings are also alarming because Minnesota is one of the states 
with extensive child welfare programs. Clearly many of the youth processed 
through the court and detention in Hennepin County could be served more 
appropriately by child welfare agencies. 
*The situation of the “runaway” is particularly disturbing when contrasted 
with truancy, for “runaways” constituted 57% of this sample. The size of the 
number given the population of this community suggests that the court was 
the first agency involved rather than the one of last resort. 
‘The 601 Diversion Project Report (Baron & Feeney, 1972) provides find- 
ings to support for early and flexible intervention to help families solve crisis 
problems when they arise. This project was directed toward status offenders 
(classified as 601’s m the California Juvenile Code). It demonstrated that 
these youth can be diverted successfully from the court and that subsequent 
contact will then be reduced. 
“Data from Children in Custody for 1971, 1973 and 1971 (NCJ KS) indicate 
that while some states have made marked changes in the processing of status 
offenders, the overall picture is one . . which one-third or more continue to 
be processed through juvenile courts and held in some type of program 
facility. The experience of New York in In Re Ellery C. provrdes little reason 
for optimism with respect to the outcomes of differential handling. 
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TABLE 2 
Distribution of Offenders by Type of Correctional Facility 
Institutions Open Programs Total 
% fn) % fn) % (72) 
Juvenile delinquents 84.9 (792) 15.1 (141) 100.0 (933) 
Status offenders 66.5 (355) 33.5 (179) 100.0 (534) 
TOtill 78.2(1,147)21.8- (320) 1oo.o (1,467) 
Source of Data: National Assessment of Juvenile Corrections, University of Michigan, 
Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1976. 
the 37 did not have a mixture of both types of offenders. The 
two exceptions, one public and one private, had a client popu- 
lation of less than seven offenders. Our observations clearly 
indicate that separation essentially does not exist. The actual 
situation, which is in accord with the findings of the Institute 
of judicial Administration (1975), is clearly in violation of the 
letter and the spirit of the law. 
Since the implementation of the 1977 Amendment to the 
JJDP Act, states receiving grants under that legislation were to 
reduce the holding of status offenders by 75% in order to be 
in compliance. The majority of states have committed substan- 
tial resources to that goal and many have achieved compli- 
ance. Data from the national evaluation of the Deinstitutional- 
ization of Status Offender Projects is now underway and will 
reveal the extent to which the goals have been achieved na- 
tionally. However, recent complimentary studies by Lerman 
(1980) suggest that what may have been achieved is only a 
recycling of youth from public training schools and detention 
centers to private institutions and mental hospitals. 
Table 2 further indicates that the majority of both law 
violators and status offenders end up in institutions, although 
there is a greater tendency to place delinquents in institutions. 
When comparisons are made by sex, as in Table 3, it is 
evident that proportionately more females than males are com- 
mitted for status offenses. Of course, males outnumber females 
by more than two to one, but given the fact that the arrest ratio 
of males to females is 4 to 1, the disproportionate institutional- 
ization of females is readily apparent. A 1974 study in Louis- 
ville reported status offenses accounted for 46% of female re- 
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TABLE 3 
Commitment Offense, by Program Type and Sex (in Percentages). 
Probation Drugs 
Status or parole Mis- or Prop- 
offense“ violation demeanor alcohol erty Person (n) 
Institution 
Male 23 4 2 6 46 1s (832) 
Female 50 1 3 18 14 14 (349) 
Community 
Residential 
Male 50 3 1 10 26 10 (70) 




3 4 6 30 12 (164) 
0 0 5 3 5 (37) 
Note: Determination of commitment offense was based on youth response to the 
question, “Why were you sent here?’ 
‘Status offenses include incorrigibility. dependent and neglected. truancy. running 
away, curfew violations, disorderly, etc. 
Source of Data: National Assessment of Juvenile Corrections. University of Michigan, 
Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1976. 
ferrals, with more detention and institutionalization of females, 
despite the fact that their offenses were far less serious (Juve- 
nile Justice Digest, 1976). Data from that same city indicated 
that “home detention” was as effective as other forms despite 
the reluctance to utilize it in many communities.’ 
Responses of youth in the National Assessment of Juve- 
nile Corrections sample of correctional programs permitted 
some examination of the labeling and stigmatization process. 
Youth were asked why they were sent to the program in 
which they were placed and if they perceived that “people 
think of me as a criminal because I’m here.” The latter ques- 
tion measures subjective perception of labeling. Responses 
were analyzed with reference to several variables, including 
patterns of official intervention, type of program placement, 
‘Until recently manv jails incarcerated “alcoholics“ or “drunks” in a manner 
similar to the handiing of status offenders but with the passage of decrimi- 
nalization statutes pertaining to alcoholic beverages, this practice has de- 
clined sharply. Moreover, the Supreme Court decision in Robimon ‘L’. GA/or- 
niu 370 U.S. (1962) forbade punishment for being ill as was noted rarlier. 
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staff-youth interaction patterns, and personal characteristics 
of youth. 
Analysis of youth responses reveals that 50% of the youth 
thought that they were considered criminal. Among first of- 
fenders, 34% held these opinions, but there was no significant 
difference between youth initially committed for status rather 
than criminal offenses. Fewer females than males believed that 
they were considered criminal (46% versus 55%), but there 
was a smaller difference for females when offense was con- 
trolled. The subjective probability of being labeled criminal 
increases proportionally to the frequency and types of contact 
between youth and the justice system. These findings provide 
considerable support for the recommendation of parsimony 
regarding the extent of intervention with respect to status of- 
fenders (Grichting, 1975). 
A recent study in the Family Court of New York of “un- 
governability” cases indicates that 62% of these youths are fe- 
males in mid-adolescence, disproportionately non-white and 
from large, poor, and single-parent or broken families (“Com- 
ment,” 1974). They also observed that 37% were “neglected” 
but classified as “ungovernable” in order to expedite process- 
ing. Sixty-eight percent of these youths were held in secure 
detention, despite its obvious impropriety. Finally, they ob- 
served that higher proportions of these youths were adjudi- 
cated and committed to residential facilities than were youth 
who committed serious property or person crimes. A study of 
the Michigan Department of Social Services drew similar con- 
clusions about institutional placement of non-aggressive youth 
(Michigan, 1975). 
The New York and Louisville studies document another 
frequent observation regarding status offenders. Those who 
wind up in the juvenile court and correctional programs are 
disproportionately poor and minority youths whose parents 
lack needed emotional and economic resources. For many 
young people-particularly those residing in the inner city 
ghettos-the law is an omnipresent fact of daily life. It is 
estimated in some cities that 90% of these young people will 
have been arrested at least once before the age of 18. Such a 
statistic is shocking in terms of the level of punitive social 
control being exercised over these youths. Even a police state 
254 Sarri 
would not function properly if it were required to maintain 
forcible control over 90% of the popuiation. 
At a time when support for the institution of the family is 
precarious, the formalized coercive intervention by the court 
serves to undermine family authority, isolates the children 
from parents and encourages parents to abdicate their roles 
(Cough, 1978; Mahoney, 1974). Court intervention actually 
may constrain the range of services available to youth and 
their family because the school and community agencies will 
be quite willing to allow the court to handle the situation fully. 
As Cough (1978) noted, there are several studies that support 
these observations that the court has been utilizing to regulate 
parent-child relationships in ways that have produced negative 
outcomes. 
Youths from middle and upper income families may be 
arrested for status misconduct, but they are handled informally 
in nearly all cases. Parents arrange for special counseling, pri- 
vate schools, and so forth. Incarceration and court sanctions 
can be avoided by those who have the necessary resources. The 
care of other youths turned over to authorities by their families 
is particularly disturbing, for these youths are frightened, con- 
fused and often alienated from close interpersonal relation- 
ships. They feel angry and abandoned. In this state they are 
dealt with by law enforcement agencies and the court in a rigid 
and punitive manner; seldom is anything done to relieve their 
anxiety, depression or anger. It is quite obvious that the court is 
not the proper agency to deal with family problems presented 
as status offenses. In California, the Sacramento Community 
Crisis Intervention Program has demonstrated that alternative 
forms of intervention could be successful in alleviating family 
problems so that court action is unnecessary (Baron & Feeney, 
1972). 
One unfortunate consequence of present approaches to 
the problems of the status offender is that it is very easy to 
enter the juvenile justice system, but once inside, it is very 
difficult to exit. Laws governing non-criminal behaviors pro- 
vide parents, schools, and community agencies with easy ac- 
cess to the court for the purpose of their taking action toward 
a juvenile. Research findings now indicate that one of the 
fikely outcomes from this intervention may be socialization 
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toward more serious delinquency. Study findings are mixed 
with respect to subsequent recidivism by status offenders and 
other youths charged with more serious delinquency (Clarke, 
1974; Heuser, 1979; Spergel et al., 1979). But, it does seem 
clear that youth are not benefitted because of court interven- 
tion and that may be the most significant criticism of present 
policies regarding status offenses. In a longitudinal and com- 
prehensive evaluation of diversion programs in Illinois, Sper- 
gel and his colleagues have stated that youths who receive 
crises services at home have fewer subsequent contacts with 
the juvenile justice system than those held in detention, group 
homes, or institutions. (Spergel et al., 1979). The less intrusive 
the alternative, they note, the fewer subsequent justice system 
contacts of all types. The Chicago group also observed that the 
system is particularly problematic for females who tend to be 
chronic “pure types,” and yet they are disproportionately 
placed in detention and held in institutions for longer periods 
of time. They commented that, “chronic status offense behav- 
ior is mainly a sex role and to some extent a family problem” 
(p- 87). 
It appears that the type of community is more critical in 
the selection of girls for processing. Higher levels of process- 
ing of females were observed in middle and upper class com- 
munities. In contrast, the phenomenon of “widening the net” 
was observed more often in lower SES communities in Illinois. 
But Spergel et al. (1979) also commented: 
Regardless of the type of community, a youth officer is more likely 
to adjust a delinquent with a prior record and permit him or her to 
remain in the community, than a status offender with a prior record. 
fp- 911 
It is often said that the court is at the top of a pyramid of 
agencies which may intervene into a juvenile’s life. Resort to 
the court is said to be the “last resort,” but unfortunately, this 
appears to be an incorrect observation today. Many first of- 
fenders are dealt with as stringently as those with multiple 
charges and many youths in the juvenile justice system have 
relatively little prior contact with social welfare agencies, so 
that they lack knowledge of diversion alternatives. 
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Policy and Program Issues 
Policy. Implementation of Sec. 223 of the Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-415) which 
requires that status offenders not be co-mingled with other 
delinquents or held in secure custody has produced significant 
policy changes in many states. However, the momentum is 
uneven and the 1977 amendments grant the states up to five 
years for full implementation. Moreover, most states have 
been reluctant to remove status offenders from the jurisdic- 
tion of the juvenile court with the result that the final out- 
comes may be far less than was anticipated by Senator Bayh 
and the other sponsors of the legislation. 
Given priorities for the development of prevention and 
diversion policies and programs vis-a-vis status offenders, nu- 
merous issues arise as to how and by whom these policies 
should be implemented. With a particular regard to diversion, 
it is important to understand how this policy can result in 
viable referral out of the justice system. rather than “lesser 
penetration” and then referral out. The evidence from Willi- 
ams and Gold (1972); and Gold and Reimer (1975) suggest 
clearly that avoidance of any contact with the justice system is 
to be fostered if subsequent delinquent behavior is not to in- 
crease. Resources for prevention strategies have been reduced 
at federal and state levels in the past decade. Without such 
efforts, effective diversion is not likely to occur for the major- 
ity of youths needing alternative community services. 
Rates of crime committed by youth had been rapidly in- 
creasing, but reliable objective measurement of this increase 
was never completed. Particularly disturbing were the reports 
of increases in violent crime by youth. These reports are lead- 
ing to punitive policies in many states despite the lack of reli- 
able and valid evidence about the phenomenon. Youth popu- 
lations are now declining rapidly, but policy decisions may be 
more reflective of the past than the present and future. 
Levine ( 1973), Wald and Schwartz ( 1974) and others have 
suggested that if responsibility for status offenders is trans- 
ferred from the juvenile court to child welfare or other social 
service organizations, policies must be initiated to assure pro- 
tection of individual rights and provision of effective services. 
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They argue that the past conduct of some of these agencies 
have been such that serious questions can be raised about their 
capability and accountability in the provision of quality ser- 
vices. Given the findings from the study of the New York 
Family Court (“Comment,” 1974), one has little reason for 
optimism, unless there are changes in the existing policies and 
practices of public social service agencies for children. 
The inability and inappropriateness of the state’s attempt 
to legislate or enforce morality is a policy issue of importance 
throughout the United States. Nowhere is this more apparent 
than in issues relating to laws and policies governing children’s 
conduct. When powerful, widely available media such as tele- 
vision and films challenge moral norms in extremely provoca- 
tive ways, it is difficult for the state to use the juvenile court to 
enforce behavior contradictory to that which is advocated in 
the media. Our current situation is a “Catch 22” for adolescent 
youth: use of the juvenile court to enforce moral norms no 
longer acknowledged by the adult society will not only be inef- 
fective, but will also jeopardize the court’s legitimate operation 
as a judicial agency. Adherence to law is dependent on volun- 
tary assent by the majority of the population. If youth per- 
ceive the court as attempting to enforce moral norms not 
adhered to by adults, they are likely to lower their valuation of 
the agency. 
Juvenile court staff have expressed views about which 
agencies should handle categories of behavior now under the 
jurisdiction of the court. The findings in Table 4 from a Na- 
tional Assessment of Juvenile Corrections survey of a sample 
of 400 juvenile courts report on the views of judge and proba- 
tion officers about status offenses, misdemeanors, and felo- 
nies. Probation officers, more frequently than judges, said that 
status offenders should be removed from the court and be 
handled by a nonjudicial agency. Judges and probation of- 
ficers agree that truancy is best handled nonjudicially, but 
differ about running away and promiscuity. Probation officers 
are those staff most directly involved in service delivery to 
these youth so their responses have particular relevance. 
Among the judges who responded, those who spent at least 
35% of their time on juvenile matters were more likely to hold 
views similar to those of probation officers. These responses 
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TABLE 4 
Juvenile Judge’s and Probation Officers’ Preferred Jurisdiction 
over Certain Offenses Committed by Juveniles.” In percentages of 
Judges (n = 252-269) and of Probation Officers (n = 469-491)b 
Nonjudicial 
uvenile court Adult court agency 
Judges P.O.‘s Judges P.O.‘s Judges P.O.‘s 
Status Offense 
Truancy 44 3.5 - - 56 65 
Promiscuity 54 35 - - 46 65 
Running away 61 47 - - 39 53 
Misdemeanor 
Liquor violation 81 68 - 4 14 27 
Vandalism 94 95 ; 2 4 3 
Shoplifting 94 90 2 2 4 8 
Felony 
Armed robbery 69 58 31 42 C 0.5 < 0.5 
Breaking 8c entering 94 96 5 3 < 0.5 1 
Auto theft 92 91 7 9 1 0.5 
*Numbers vary due to responses that could not be classified into either of the three 
choices listed. 
bQuestion: Which of these problems do you feel are best handled by the juvenile 
court, an adult court, or other social agencies (schools, child welfare, etc.)? 
further suggest that the greater the contact with status offense 
situations. the more likely it is that court personnel will state 
that this non-criminal behavior should be handled by a nonju- 
dicial agency. 
Program Issues. Institutional placement of youth for non- 
criminal status behavior is still prevalent in the majority of 
states despite numerous recommendations for alternative 
community-based programming. However, experience of 
those states with variable community-based programs indicates 
that they can be viable and effective for the majority of youth. 
Moreover, there are no conclusive data which suggest that the 
overwhelming majority of youth would not accept needed ser- 
vices if they were offered voluntaristically. The experience of 
many innovative community-based programs for youth clearly 
indicates a high level of receptivity to these services. Unfortu- 
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nately, and in contrast to adult program planning, many pub- 
lic statements continue to be made by both professional and 
lay leaders that coercion is necessary in programming for 
youths charged as status offenders. 
Because of the frequency of assertions that status of- 
fenders actually commit acts equally serious to those committed 
by other delinquents, the findings in Table 5 are relevant. 
Judge Lindsay Arthur (1975) advocated juvenile court inter- 
vention because, he asserted, status offenders do not differ in 
their behavior from other delinquents. The national sample of 
youth studies by the National Assessment of Juvenile Correc- 
tions were asked to report how many times prior to their pre- 
sent placement they had engaged in various deviant behaviors. 
The findings make it quite clear that youths who are committed 
for person or property offenses report that they have engaged 
in law violative behavior far more frequently than those who 
were committed for status offenses. Only in the case of “run- 
ning away” was there any exception to this pattern, for 37% of 
the “status offenders” reported running away 3 or more times, 
while 35% of the “property” and 33% of the “person” of- 
fenders so reported. In contrast, 20% of the status offenders 
reported 3 or more times of “breaking and entering,” but 59% 
of the “property” offenders and 54% of the “person” offenders 
reported this incidence of committing B & E’s.~ 
The problematic nature of school-youth interactions are 
clearly evident in these data for 39% of the status offenders, 
52% of the property and 61% of the person offenders re- 
ported being suspended 3 or more times. These data also 
refute the assertion of Judge Arthur that there are no differ- 
ences between status offenders and youths committed for felo- 
nies and misdemeanors. Of course, all youths reported fre- 
quent anti-social acts, but these responses are in accord with 
those obtained by Gold and Riemer (1975), and Williams and 
Gold (1972), and Spergel et al. (1979). 
When youths were asked about antisocial behavior follow- 
ing their placement in a correctional program, such behavior 
increased substantially for status offenders the longer they 
‘See Isenstadt et al. (1976) and Vinter, Kish, and Newcomb (1976). pp. 41- 
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were placed in correctional programs. Thus, the interaction 
appeared to have resulted in socialization to criminal behavior. 
The survey of alternative programming for status of- 
fenders in Illinois revealed some critical programming dilem- 
mas (Lynch, Korbelik, & Spergel, 1977). Over 80% of the 
status offenders who were apprehended had no previous in- 
volvement with the justice system. Despite that fact, they were 
more likely to be detained than youth charged with delinquent 
offenses even when the latter had several prior offenses. 
Lynch et al. (1977) concluded that “Status offense behavior is 
not pre-delinquent behavior” for youths tended to ‘specialize’ 
in different types of deviancy.” Their apprehension by police 
reflected the type and amount of resources in the community, 
rather than actual incidence of problematic behavior. They 
recommended greater parsimony in processing by police and 
courts, plus development of more general local community 
service agencies for youth. 
The “Expansion” Hypothesis 
The development of programs which are alternatives to 
incarceration appear to be a “mixed blessing” in the case of 
status offenders, unless these youths are wholly removed from 
the juvenile court jurisdiction for processing and program- 
ming. The experience of New York, with respect to the pro- 
cessing of PINS cases, was largely ineffective, according to the 
analyses completed by the Institute of Judicial Administration 
(1975); the report of Elizabeth Schach (1973); and the study 
of ungovernability cases in the Family Court (“Comment,” 
1974). Similarly Vinter, Downs, and Hall (1976) observed that 
as states moved to deinstitutionalize juvenile offenders, the 
results often were increased numbers of youth under the su- 
pervision of the courts and correctional agencies. Most re- 
cently, Spergel et al. (1979) in their preliminary evaluation of 
the status offender alternatives project in Illinois noted that 
while the project was very successful in reducing detention in 
Cook County, there was a 53% increase in police referrals of 
status offenders to the juvenile court. They noted that police 
were apparently casting a wider control net, since there was no 
independent evidence of changed behavioral patterns among 
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youth. Clearly, these findings all suggest that there have been 
negative unanticipated consequences from the development of 
new programs and policies for status offenders, while still 
keeping them under juvenile court jurisdiction and relying on 
police as the primary referral source. The Iflinois project also 
noted that where youths were dealt with w/zoEl~ outside the 
legal system, the service was fully as adequate, often better, 
and there did not appear to be negative consequences in the 
form of labelling, differential association, and so forth. It is 
most unfortunate that juveniles who are from poor neighbor- 
hoods and single-parent households are more likely to be ap- 
prehended for status behavior, whereas, in middle class and 
two-parent households, voluntary community services are pro- 
vided for youths who engage in such behavior. Data which are 
available, although inadequate, indicate rather clearly that the 
latter alternative is preferable, both in terms of short-term and 
long-term outcomes. 
Action Strategies 
Z%e A~~t~~~~Z Scene. The federal government and national 
youth organizations have until very recentlv given little atten- 
tion to adolescent youth socialization policies, especially for 
youths identified as status offenders. Statutory changes and 
new proposals now provide significant opportunities for both. 
This society urgently needs an assertion of moral, political and 
normative leadership at the national level. The strategy pro- 
posed here is contrary to programs which have developed 
under general and special revenue sharing where the federal 
government assumed minimal responsibility for how the 
monies were spent locally. Experience with LEAA Block 
Grants was very poor with respect to proportional allocation 
of funds for youth services as Melekos (1976) points out. The 
federal government has the capability to perform four major 
functions needed to buttress and improve youth programs 
across the nation: 
I. Establish priorities, standards and guidelines ,for comprefien- 
sive youth sertkes. The products of the National Advisory Com- 
mission on Correctional Standards and Goals and of the Na- 
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tional Commission on the Mental Health of Children provide 
exemplars which need to be extended to cover youth services 
generally. The formulation of guidelines regarding the rights 
of minors to social services must be done at the national level 
in a society that is as mobile as that of the United States. 
Inter-agency exchange and communication is needed at the 
federal level through mechanisms such as interdepartmental 
committees on families and children. Initiative for this effort 
is appropriately the responsibility of the Departments of Edu- 
cation, Labor and of Health and Human Services. One can 
hardly expect coordination at the state and local level when 
such coordination is nearly non-existent at the federal level. 
2. Channeling resources for strategic aims. This society as- 
signs a very low priority to policies and programs for youth. 
In fact, several authorities have commented that the United 
States as a society “dislikes” children, given the types of social 
programs for youth which are supported. Youth are the na- 
tion’s most valuable resource, but at present, nationally, they 
fall far below energy, the environment, and military defense 
in any listing of priorities. Moreover, programs and resources 
are far more readily available for adults than for youth. Re- 
cent reports of the U. S. Census Bureau indicate that children 
are the most rapidly increasing age group of poor-now sur- 
passing the aged, because of recent changes in Social Security 
legislation. 
3. Fostering innovation, experimentation and evaluation in 
programs for youth. The United States lacks a coherent theory 
of adolescent socialization which can be applied now and dur- 
ing the next quarter century. Although many have argued for 
more research support for study of this problem, of equal 
value in the development of such a theory would be careful 
innovation and evaluation of new programs and services. 
Already underway in some states are a number of cre- 
ative innovations which provide the basis for developing new 
policies and guidelines. Further federal encouragement of 
these efforts is needed, and, following that, wide dissemina- 
tion of results, so that other communities have information for 
more rational decision-making. Our knowledge is such that 
one could not be optimistic about the development of pro- 
gram models, but at least some effort could be extended in 
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that direction. The support for innovative programs, however, 
should not jeopardize existing policies around which some 
consensus has been developed-for example, deinscitutional- 
ization and the use of the least restrictive alternatives in pro- 
gramming, decriminalization of status offenses, and diversion 
of youth to voluntary community programs. 
4. ~~~@~~~ a ~~~0~~ ~nf~~t~u~ nfT~t~&t~r~. The bar- 
riers to poiicy-making and program development result in im- 
portant ways from the lack of systematic, comparative and 
reliable information about patterns, trends, etc. Few states 
have been able to develop information systems, but even 
where they have, they are deprived of more general informa- 
tion from outside their own jurisdictions. Lacking such infor- 
mation, administrators, legislators and planners proceed on 
the basis of intuition, ex erience, revelation or reactive re- 
sponse to public pressure. !? 
Among other things, information is needed on: censuses 
of the populations of all shelters and residential programs for 
youth, school truancy and exclusion practices and outcomes, 
child welfare service delivery by voluntary and public agen- 
cies, differentiated program experiences by region of the 
country, ethnicity, social class, and so forth. More difficult to 
obtain, but sorely needed, is information about children’s 
rights, and the mechanisms through which these are assured. 
The Local Community 
Although federal policies and programs have played a 
critical role in stimulating changes in the processing of status 
offenders into and through the justice system, it is probable 
that this problem will not be solved without the development 
of effective alternative programs in the local community. A 
number of models for such community programs have ai- 
ready been designed and tested so that they provide guidance 
?he current concerns about youth violence is one contemporary example 
of this phenomena where critical information is lacking and far-reaching 
decisions are being made about this problem. With respect to the problem- 
atic behavior of this type only the federal government is in a position to 
obtain and disseminate valid and reliable information, or at least to assume 
responsibility for its collection. 
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for local action. The American Public Welfare Association 
(1977), Dixon and Wright (1976), Heasiey (1975), Polk (1971), 
and Rosenheim (1960) have presented a variety of models for 
local services including Youth Service Bureau as the key com- 
ponent. Empey (1978) and his colleagues have described sev- 
eral programs that have relied heavily on guided group inter- 
action technologies as a focal element. A variety of group 
homes and runaway shelter programs have been initiated to 
serve youth at risk because of non-criminal misconduct (Bar- 
tollas & Miller, 1978; Coates, Miller, & Ohlin, 1978; and 
Vinter, Downs, & Hall, 1976; Wolf, Phillips, & Fixsen, 1974). 
And, more recently, outdoor adventure and alternative school 
programs have developed rapidly in many states (Krajick, 
1978; Mann, Petronio, 8c Gold, 1978). 
Analysis of the policy and program recommendations of 
the above authors and others suggest several areas of consen- 
sus for effective programming. These include: 
1. Diversion and deinstitutionalization and decriminaliza- 
tion must continue to be areas receiving continuing priority so 
that more resources will be available in all states. 
2. Programs must aim to reduce coercive control, disci- 
pline, and punishment. 
3. Programs must provide continuing and frequent links 
to community and must seek to reconcile youth, their families 
and their communities. 
4. Programs must provide for the adolescent’s need for 
self direction, growth, and opportunities to resolve identity 
crises. Goals must be achievable, and recognized by youth as 
being just and in their own interest, not merely to benefit 
society as a whole. 
5. Programs must be geared to meet the variable needs 
and characteristics of communities and their youth. Particular 
attention is required to ensure the delivery of quality services 
at the time and in the places where they are needed. 
6. Continuing attention must be directed toward obtain- 
ing adequate resources. Diversion and other alternative pro- 
grams often face critical survival problems because of resource 
limitations and over-reliance on non-renewable federal grants. 
7. Community involvement is essential for successful 
programs, but that involvement must be planned for and sup- 
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ported in accordance with variable sociocultural characteristics 
of communities. 
8. The final structure of a youth services system is de- 
pendent upon the political processes operative in a particular 
community. Obviously, there will be great variation within and 
among states. Federal assistance and support need to be 
planned with awareness of this contingency, but accountability 
need not be jeopardized by highly differentiated structural 
patterns. 
Conclusion 
Recent disturbances in many urban communities plus the 
rapidly growing problems of substance abuse, teenage preg- 
nancy, and family conflict alarm all Americans. But, the solu- 
tions do not lie in more coercive control and incarceration, for 
then the cure may be worse than the illness. Youth urgently 
need opportunity for greater access to legitimate social roles. 
Services must be provided with greater attention to humane- 
ness, fairness and justice. Many youth-serving agencies, public 
and private, have abdicated their responsibilities to adolescent 
youth with the result that ever increasing numbers are being 
processed through the juvenile justice system, held in punitive 
adult jails and detention, and then institutionalized in various 
types of asylums. 
Too often the United States has waited to develop pro- 
grams after serious problems have arisen; a “Band-Aid” solu- 
tion will not be adequate for the problems which confront us in 
the areas of employment, mental health, delinquency, family 
dissolution and inadequate parenting, declining educational 
performance, and substance abuse. Most of our experience in 
solving social problems of this magnitude suggests that epide- 
miological and comprehensive services are required. Social 
policies are required which accept the reality of the contempo- 
rary situation and then establish realistic goals and priorities for 
a post-industrial society. Youth-serving organizations must 
then act to facilitate implementation of the programs necessary 
for adolescent socialization that will increase the achievement 
of those goals. 
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